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Large and persistent global financial imbalances need not be the harbinger of a world financial crash.
Instead, we show that these imbalances can be the outcome of financial integration when countries
differ in financial markets deepness. In particular, countries with more advanced financial markets
accumulate foreign liabilities in a gradual, long-lasting process. Differences in financial deepness also
affect the composition of foreign portfolios: countries with negative net foreign asset positions maintain
positive net holdings of non-diversifiable equity and FDI. Abstracting from the potential impact of
globalization on financial development, liberalization leads to sizable welfare gains for the more financially-developed
countries and losses for the others. Three empirical observations motivate our analysis: (1)financial
deepness varies widely even amongst industrial countries, with the United States ranking at the top;
(2) the secular decline in the U.S. net foreign asset position started in the early 1980s, together with
a gradual process of international capital markets liberalization; (3) net exports and current account
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At the end of 2006 the current account deﬁcit of the United States reached
2 percentage points of the world’s GDP and the country’s net foreign liabil-
ities reached 8 percent of global output. The IMF (2006) expects the U.S.
current account to remain in the red through 2011. By then, U.S. net for-
eign liabilities will be about 15 percent the size of the global economy. The
composition of the US foreign portfolio has also changed during the last two
decades: While net foreign liabilities have reached one-third of the U.S. GDP,
portfolio equity and FDI have climbed to one-tenth of GDP.
These imbalances are fueling heated debates in academic and policy cir-
cles. On the one hand there is the view that, unless major policy actions
are taken, the imbalances will generate global ﬁnancial turbulence and, pos-
sibly, a world economic crisis.1 On the other hand, there is the view that the
imbalances are the harmless outcome of various events such as diﬀerences
in productivity growth or business cycle volatility, demographic dynamics, a
‘global saving glut’, or valuation eﬀects. This view is summarized in Backus,
Henriksen, Lambert & Telmer (2005).2
This paper proposes an explanation of global imbalances that has not
been explored in this debate. We argue that both the large, persistent global
imbalances and their portfolio composition could be the result of interna-
tional ﬁnancial integration among countries with heterogeneous domestic
ﬁnancial markets. The far-reaching reforms that liberalized international
capital markets during the 1980s and 1990s were predicated on the beneﬁts
that ﬁnancial integration would have for eﬃcient resource allocation and risk-
sharing across countries. But these arguments generally abstracted from the
fact that ﬁnancial systems diﬀered substantially across countries, and those
diﬀerences have remained largely unaltered despite the globalization of cap-
ital markets. In short, ﬁnancial integration was a global phenomenon but
ﬁnancial development was not.
The motivation for studying global imbalances from this perspective de-
rives from three observations:
1See, for example, Summers (2004), Obstfeld & Rogoﬀ (2004), Roubini & Setser (2005),
Blanchard, Giavazzi & Sa (2005), Krugman (2006).
2See also Bernanke (2005), Croke, Kamin and Leduc (2005), Gourinchas and Rey
(2005), Hausmann & Sturzenegger (2005), Henriksen (2005), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2005), Caballero, Farhi & Gourinchas (2006), Cavallo and Tille (2006), Engel and Rogers
(2006), Fogli and Perri (2006), Ghironi, Lee and Rebucci (2006).
11. Measures of ﬁnancial development or ﬁnancial deepness diﬀer sharply
across countries, even across industrialized countries, and the diﬀer-
ences have changed little during the past 10 years (Figure 1).
2. The net foreign asset position of the country with the highest level
of ﬁnancial development—the United States—shows a secular decline
starting in the early 1980s, at roughly the same time when many coun-
tries started to liberalize their capital accounts (Figures 2 and 3).
3. Net exports and current account balances, as a share of GDP, are neg-
atively correlated with proxies for the degree of ﬁnancial development
(Figure 5).
These empirical observations raise three important questions that this
papers seeks to answer. First, if countries involved in the process of ﬁnancial
integration are characterized by diﬀerent ﬁnancial structures, do we expect to
see the type of imbalances and portfolio composition we observe in the data?
Second, are the imbalances temporary or permanent? Third, are policies
aiming at correcting the imbalances desirable?
We address these questions with a multi-country dynamic general equi-
librium model with incomplete asset markets. Countries are inhabited by
a continuum of ex-ante identical consumers who face two types of idiosyn-
cratic shocks: endowment and investment shocks. ‘Financial development’ is
deﬁned by the extent to which ﬁnancial contracts are enforceable. This can
range from the case of perfect enforceability—allowing for the full insurance
of the idiosyncratic risk (complete markets)—to the case in which enforce-
ment is so limited that the only mechanism for consumption smoothing is
the accumulation of non-contingent assets.
Analytical characterizations as well as numerical simulations of a two-
country version of the model show that, if country U (say the United States) is
more ﬁnancially developed than country E (Europe or emerging economies),
ﬁnancial integration causes U’s net foreign asset position to decline sharply
in the long-run. In fact, moderate diﬀerences in ﬁnancial deepness can easily
lead to net foreign asset positions larger than domestic production. Moreover,
this is a gradual and long-lasting process that can take more than 30 years.
The model also predicts that countries with diﬀerent ﬁnancial markets
characteristics choose diﬀerent compositions for their foreign asset portfolios,
in a pattern that broadly resembles the portfolio compositions observed in
the data. In particular, country U invests in foreign risky assets and ﬁnances
2this investment with debt, so its net foreign asset position features a large
negative position in riskless bonds and a positive position in risky assets.
This is in line with the structure of the U.S. external position documented
by Gourinchas and Rey (2005) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005).3
Large and persistent global imbalances in our model are fully consistent
with intertemporal solvency conditions and do not lead to a ﬁnancial crash
or a ‘Sudden Stop’. The model’s welfare implications, however, suggest that
capital markets liberalization is not always beneﬁcial for all countries. In
particular, countries with less developed ﬁnancial markets experience wel-
fare losses. Our model, however, ignores other potential gains from capital
markets liberalization such as the transfer of technology, speedier ﬁnancial
markets development and risk-sharing beneﬁts. With the consideration of
these other beneﬁts, the net welfare consequences of ﬁnancial globalization
could still be positive for all countries.
There are few papers that investigate global imbalances with quantita-
tive dynamic models. Among these are Chapter 1 of IMF (2005), Hunt and
Rebucci (2005) and Faruqee, Laxton, Muir & Pesenti (2005). These studies
conduct simulations based on multi-country, multi-sector models with nom-
inal rigidities, in line with the New Open Economy Macroeconomics. Their
main focus is on the analysis of alternative policy scenarios for the unwinding
of the imbalances, rather than explaining the imbalances themselves. Global
imbalances emerge as the outcome of a combination of exogenous shocks,
such as a permanent increase in the U.S. ﬁscal deﬁcit, a permanent decline
in the rate of time preference in the U.S., and a permanent increase in foreign
demand for U.S. ﬁnancial assets. In contrast, the model developed in this
paper predicts a reduction in U.S. savings and an increase in the foreign de-
mand for U.S. assets endogenously, after ﬁnancial integration, because of the
diﬀerent characteristics of the U.S. ﬁnancial system. This occurs even if all
countries have identical preferences, resources and production technologies.
The premise that diﬀerences in domestic asset markets can produce ex-
ternal imbalances has precedent in the literature. Willen (2004) studied the
qualitative predictions of a two-period endowment-economy model with ex-
3According to the March 2006 version of the Lane-Milesi database, the U.S. net foreign
asset position fell from a share of GDP of 4 percent in 1980 to -23 percent in 2004. This
resulted from a sustained widening in the net debt position, from near zero to about -32
percent, and an increase in the net position in portfolio equity and FDI, from 3.7 to 9
percent. In contrast, in the1970s, the decade before ﬁnancial integration started, the U.S.
net foreign asset position and its components remained relatively stable.
3ponential utility, heterogenous agents, and normal-i.i.d. shocks. He showed
that, under incomplete markets, trade imbalances emerge due to reduced
savings by the agents residing in countries with ‘more complete’ asset mar-
kets. Our model embodies this mechanism but also diﬀers in two key re-
spects. First, we allow for endogenous production with ‘production risks,’
which is crucial for explaining the composition of asset portfolios in addi-
tion to net foreign asset positions. Second, we study an inﬁnite horizon
model with standard constant-relative-risk-aversion preferences and serially-
correlated shocks, exploring both the qualitative and quantitative predictions
of the model as well as its welfare implications.
The study by Caballero et al. (2006) also emphasizes the role of heteroge-
neous domestic ﬁnancial systems in explaining global imbalances, but using
a model in which ﬁnancial imperfections are captured by a country’s ability
to supply assets in a world without uncertainty. In our framework, instead,
ﬁnancial imperfections have a direct impact on savings, and therefore, on
the demand for assets. Uncertainty is crucial in our framework: without risk
there are no imbalances even if ﬁnancial markets are heterogeneous. The
two papers also diﬀer in the main driving forces for global imbalances. In
Caballero et al. the imbalances are generated by diﬀerential shocks to pro-
ductivity growth and/or to the ﬁnancial structure of countries. Our explana-
tion, instead, relies on the international integration of capital markets, given
the diﬀerences in the characteristics of domestic ﬁnancial markets. These
diﬀerences started to matter for global imbalances after the liberalization of
the 1980s and 1990s.
Some recent studies emphasize the role of demographic diﬀerences for the
emergence of the imbalances. Henriksen (2005) shows that a two-country
model calibrated to the population dynamics of the U.S. and Japan can
capture the observed magnitude and persistence of current account imbal-
ances between these two countries. Attanasio, Kitao & Violante (2006) focus
instead on the demographics dynamics of developing countries. Although
demographic diﬀerences is a compelling mechanism for capturing diﬀerences
in saving patterns, they do not account for the international portfolio com-
position outlined above. The ability to explain the portfolio composition of
observed foreign asset positions is a key feature that distinguishes our theory
from other theories.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the em-
pirical motivation of the paper. Section 3 describes the model and deﬁnes
the competitive equilibrium under autarky and under free mobility of capi-
4tal. Section 4 characterizes analytically the key properties of both equilibria.
Section 5 conducts the quantitative analysis. Section 6 extends the model
by introducing capital accumulation. Section 7 concludes.
2 Empirical motivation
The ﬁrst fact that motivates our analysis is the observation that countries
diﬀer signiﬁcantly in the deepness of their ﬁnancial markets, even industrial
countries. A recent study by the International Monetary Fund (IMF (2006))
constructs an index of ﬁnancial markets development for industrial countries.
The index combines information from three core sub-indexes: an index of tra-
ditional bank intermediation, an index of new ﬁnancial intermediation (i.e.
intermediation through direct market instruments, such as asset-backed secu-
rities and derivatives, and/or non-bank intermediaries, such as hedge funds)
and an index of general characteristics of ﬁnancial markets (e.g. stock market
turnover, investor protection, bond market capitalization, etc.). Countries
with a higher index undertake a larger volume of ﬁnancial intermediation
through direct market instruments, and thus are viewed as having attained
a higher degree of ﬁnancial development. Figure 1 shows that the United
States has the highest score and that the gaps of other countries relative to
the the U.S. have not changed substantially during the last decade.
The second key observation motivating our work relates to international
ﬁnancial integration. Chinn and Ito (2005) compiled an index of the degree
of capital account openness for 163 countries from 1970 to 2004. The index
is based on binary dummy variables that codify the tabulation of restric-
tions on cross-border ﬁnancial transactions reported in the IMF’s Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).
The dummy variables reﬂect the four major categories of restrictions: multi-
ple exchange rates, restrictions on current account transactions, restrictions
on capital account transactions, and requirements for the surrender of export
proceeds. The index is the ﬁrst standardized principal component of these
four variables and it takes higher values for countries that are more open to
cross-border capital transactions.
Figure 2 shows the Chinn-Ito ﬁnancial openness index for the United
States, the group of industrialized countries excluding the U.S., and all coun-
tries except the U.S. The indices are computed as means of individual country
indices, weighted by GDP. Although the U.S. has always been open during






















Figure 1: Financial index score for advanced economies. Source: IMF (2006).
capital accounts gradually since the beginning of the 1980s, starting ﬁrst with
the industrial countries and moving on to emerging economies in the 1990s.
What is remarkable is that the timing of the gradual, but sustained, capi-
tal account liberalization coincides with the deterioration of the U.S. foreign
asset position, as shown in the next ﬁgure.
Figure 3 plots the net foreign asset positions as a share of GDP for the
United States, the group of industrialized countries excluding the U.S., and
the group of emerging economies using the Lane-Milesi-Ferretti database.
Clearly, the deterioration of the U.S. external position is not a recent phe-
nomenon: It has been declining almost uninterrupted since the ﬁrst half of
the 1980s. This is right after industrial countries started to liberalize their
capital accounts, as show in Figure 2. In addition, Figure 4 shows that the
decline in the U.S. net foreign asset position has been accompanied by a
change in the portfolio composition of foreign assets. In particular, while
the net position in debt instruments has declined sharply, the net position in
FDI and portfolio equity has increased.
The third fact that motivates our paper is the negative relation between
international ﬂow imbalances and ﬁnancial development. As a proxy for the
latter we use ‘Domestic Credit to the Private Sector.’ This is the proxy often
used in the ﬁnance-development literature (see, for example, Demirguc-Kunt
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Figure 2: Financial openness index, 1970-2004. Source: Chinn and Ito (2005)
and www.ssc.wisc.edu/∼mchinn/research.html.
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Figure 3: Net foreign asset position relative to GDP, 1970-2004. Source:













 Net FDI and portfolio equity Net debt assets
 Net foreign assets






Figure 4: Composition of US foreign assets: Net positions in FDI and eq-
uities, and debt instruments, 1970-2004. Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2006).
and Levine (2001)), and is deﬁned as the ﬁnancial resources provided to the
private sector, such as loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade
credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment.
We study whether private credit is correlated with international ﬂow imbal-
ances, either ‘Net Exports of Goods and Services’ or the ‘Current Account
Balances’. To this end, we run the following regression:
NEXit = α0 + α1 · CREDITit + α2 · CGDPit + εit (1)
where NEX is net exports (or current account) in percentage of GDP;
CREDIT is domestic credit to the private sector also in percentage of GDP;
CGDP is per-capita GDP. The subscripts identify country and year. The
inclusion of per-capita GDP controls for the stage of economic development.
We would like to emphasize that in running this regression we are not trying
to establish a causal link. We are simply looking for conditional correlations.
We use yearly data for OECD countries for the period 2000-2004. The
results are reported in the ﬁrst column of Table 1. Figure 5 shows that
the conditional correlation between domestic credit and net exports is neg-
ative and statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that countries with deeper
8Table 1: Financial deepness and foreign imbalance in OECD countries
Net Exports Current Account
2000-2004 1995-2004 1990-2004 2000-2004 1995-2004 1990-2004
Pooled regression
CREDIT -0.0598 -0.0509 -0.0457 -0.0349 -0.0269 -0.0224
(0.0088)∗ (0.0068)∗ (0.0056)∗ (0.0099)∗ (0.0069)∗ (0.0055)∗
CGDP 0.00063 0.00058 0.00054 0.00041 0.00039 0.00035
(0.00004)∗ (0.00003)∗ (0.00003)∗ (0.00005)∗ (0.00004)∗ (0.00003)∗
CONSTANT -8.287 -7.589 -6.867 -7.053 -6.713 -6.073
(0.950)∗ (0.688)∗ (0.539) (1.121)∗ (0.722)∗ (0.538)∗
R2 0.633 0.525 0.468 0.353 0.318 0.285
Obs. 144 289 432 145 289 428
Fixed eﬀect regression
CREDIT -0.0406 -0.0448 -0.0370 -0.0505
(0.0085)∗ (0.0066)∗ (0.0092)∗ (0.0077)∗
CGDP 0.00029 0.00043 -0.00003 0.00014
(0.00006)∗ (0.00004)∗ (0.00006) (0.00005)∗
CONSTANT -1.620 -4.442 3.897 0.913
(1.191) (0.833)∗ (1.304)∗ (1.028)
R2 (within) 0.121 0.233 0.079 0.099
R2 (between) 0.541 0.543 0.100 0.010
R2 (overall) 0.472 0.461 0.049 0.013
Obs. 289 432 289 428
Notes: Data is from the World Bank, World Development Indicators. The countries included in
the sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherland,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
United Kingdom, United States.
∗ Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.
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Figure 5: Net exports and domestic credit in OECD countries, 2000-2004.
Source: See notes on Table 1.
ﬁnancial markets tend to experience trade deﬁcits while countries with lower
ﬁnancial deepness experience trade surpluses. Given the resource identity
S = I + NEX, this can be restated as saying that countries with deeper ﬁ-
nancial markets save less than their domestic investment while countries with
lower ﬁnancial deepness save more. The variation of net exports accounted
by domestic credit and per-capita GDP is quite high (R2 above 60 percent).
The ﬁnding that countries with more developed ﬁnancial markets tend to
experience larger external deﬁcits (i.e. the negative cross-country correlation
between domestic credit and net exports) is robust to several changes in the
estimation shwon in Table 1. First, we re-estimate equation 1 for 1995-2004
and 1990-2004 and obtain similar results, although the R2 tends to decline
as we extend the sample to earlier years. Second, the results are robust to
the use of the current account as a measure of foreign imbalances. Finally,
we estimate equation 1 with country ﬁxed eﬀects and largely conﬁrm the
ﬁndings from the pooled regression. The ﬁxed eﬀects results for 2000-2004
are not shown because of the short sample.
103 The model
Consider an economy composed of I countries or regions, indexed by i, all
with identical characteristics except for the deepness of domestic ﬁnancial
markets. Financial deepness is captured by a parameter φi as speciﬁed below.
Each country is populated by a continuum of agents of total mass 1 who
maximize expected lifetime utility E
P∞
t=0 βtU(ct), where ct is consumption
at time t and β is the intertemporal discount factor. The utility function is
strictly increasing and concave with U(0) = −∞ and U000(c) > 0.
Each country is endowed with unit supply of a non-reproducible, inter-
nationally immobile asset, traded at price P i
t. The asset can be used by each
individual agent in the production of a homogeneous good. The production
function is yt+1 = zt+1kν
t , where kt is the quantity of the asset used at time t,
zt+1 is an idiosyncratic shock and yt+1 is the output produced at time t + 1.
We will refer to zt+1 as the investment shock as it determines the return on
the investment kt. Because the productive asset is internationally immobile,
when agents buy the foreign asset they have to produce abroad.
In addition to production/investment income, agents receive an idiosyn-
cratic stochastic endowment, wt, that follows a discrete Markov process.
Therefore, there are two types of uncertainty or risk: from endowment and
from investment shocks.
One key diﬀerence between endowment and investment risks is that the
ﬁrst is beyond the control of the agent while the second can be avoided by
choosing not to produce, that is, by choosing not to purchase the productive
asset. The consideration of investment shocks allows us to distinguish risky
from riskless investments so that agents face a nontrivial portfolio choice.
We can then study not only how ﬁnancial markets heterogeneity aﬀects net
foreign asset positions but also their composition.
It is important to emphasize that production is individually run and
shocks are idiosyncratic. There are no aggregate shocks. Therefore, cross-
country risk-sharing is not an issue here. Also notice that there is no aggre-
gate accumulation of capital. This assumption is relaxed in Section 6 and we
ﬁnd that our key ﬁndings remain unaltered.
Let st ≡ (wt,zt) be a pair of endowment and investment shocks and
g(st,st+1) their conditional probability distribution. Agents can buy contin-
gent claims, b(st+1), that depend on the next period’s realizations of these
shocks. Because there is no aggregate uncertainty, the price of one unit




t is the equilibrium interest rate.
Deﬁne at as the end-of-period net worth before consumption. The budget
constraint is:








The net worth evolves according to:




t + b(st+1) (3)
If asset markets were complete (i.e. without restrictions on the set of
feasible claims), agents would be able to perfectly insure against the endow-
ment and investment risks. Because of market frictions, however, the set
of feasible claims is constrained in each country. We consider two types of
constraints. First, an enforceability constraint that is derived from the as-
sumption that shocks are not veriﬁable and agents can divert part of the
incomes from endowment and production. Agents loose a fraction φi of the
income they divert, so φi measures the degree of enforcement of ﬁnancial
contracts in country i. Second, a limited liability constraint: contracts are
not exclusive and there is limited liability. This implies that the end-of-
period net worth cannot be negative. Appendix A shows that, under these
conditions, incentive-compatibility imposes the following constraints:










a(sj) ≥ 0 (5)
for all j ∈ {1,...,N}. Here N denotes the number of possible realizations of
the two shocks and s1 is the lowest (worse) realization.
The ﬁrst condition requires that the variation in net worth, a(sj)−a(s1),
cannot be smaller than the variation in income, scaled by 1 − φi. When φi
is suﬃciently large, agents are able to maintain constant consumption (full
insurance). When φi = 0—implying that income can be diverted without
losses—only non-state-contingent claims are feasible. The second constraint
imposes limited liability.
Two key points of this setup are worth emphasizing. First, φi pertains to
the residency of the agents, regardless of the geographic location of the assets
they own. In particular, if asset markets are globally integrated, domestic
agents can buy foreign productive assets and receive foreign income, but still
12their feasible claims are determined by the domestic, not the foreign φ. This
assumption implies that the ability of an agent to divert investment incomes
generated abroad depends on the institutional, legal and contractual envi-
ronment of the residence country.4 Second, what is crucial for our results is
the limited ability to insure idiosyncratic risks, and not the speciﬁc source of
markets incompleteness. We chose here a setup based on limited veriﬁabil-
ity of shocks and limited liability because of its analytical simplicity. Other
frictions, such as information asymmetries, would lead to similar results as
long as they limit the agents’ ability to insure away idiosyncratic risk.




τ=t be a (deterministic) sequence of prices in country i.
A single agent’s optimization problem can be written as:
V
i




















where we have used the convention of denoting current ‘individual’ variables
without subscript and next period ‘individual’ variables with the prime su-
perscript. Notice that this is the optimization problem for any deterministic
sequence of prices, not only steady states. This motivates the time subscript
in the value function.
The solution to the agent’s problem provides the decision rules for con-
sumption, ci
t(s,a), productive assets, ki
t(s,a), and contingent claims bi
t(s,a)(s0).
These rules determine the evolution of the distribution of agents over s, k
and b, which we denote by Mi
t(s,k,b). The deﬁnition of equilibria with and
without international mobility of capital are as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 (Autarky) Given the ﬁnancial deepness, φi, and initial dis-
tributions, Mi
t(s,k,b), for i ∈ {1,..,I}, a general equilibrium without mobil-





4One way to think about this assumption is that agents repatriate the incomes earned
abroad. Once the incomes are transferred back to the home country, the veriﬁability of
these incomes is determined by the local institutions.
13(ii) value functions {V i
τ(s,a)}∞







τ=t+1. Such that: (i) the policy rules solve problem
(6) and {V i
τ(s,k)}∞
τ=t are the associated value functions; (ii) prices satisfy
qi
τ = g(s,s0)/(1 + ri




τ(s,k,b) = 1, R
s,k,b,w0 bi
τ(s,a)(w0)Mi
τ(s,k,b)g(s,s0) = 0 for all τ ≥ t and in each country
i ∈ {1,..,I}; (iv) the sequence of distributions is consistent with the initial
distribution, the individual policies and the idiosyncratic shocks.
Deﬁnition 2 (Financial integration) Given the ﬁnancial deepness, φi,
and initial distributions, Mi
t(s,k,b), for i ∈ {1,..,I}, a general equilib-












τ=t; (iv) distributions {Mi
τ(s,k,b)}∞
τ=t+1. Such that:
(i) the policy rules solve problem (6) and {V i
τ(s,k)}∞
τ=t are the associated
value functions; (ii) prices satisfy qi
τ = g(s,s0)/(1+ri
t), P i
τ = Pτ and ri
τ = rτ,












τ(s,k,b)g(s,s0) = 0 for all τ ≥ t; (iv) the sequence of
distributions is consistent with the initial distribution, the individual policies
and the idiosyncratic shocks.
The only diﬀerence in the two deﬁnitions is that with ﬁnancial integration
there is a global market for assets, and hence asset prices are equalized across
countries (conditions (ii) and (iii)). This also implies that the assets owned by
a country are no longer equal to the assets located in the country. Therefore,
foreign asset positions are not necessarily zero. Also notice that one country
may hold a larger share of the world productive asset than its domestic share.
In this case a fraction of this country’s agents will be producing abroad.
However, the set of feasible claims still depends on the domestic φi.
4 Characterization of the equilibrium
This section characterizes the properties of the equilibrium with and without
international ﬁnancial integration. To illustrate these properties, it is conve-
nient to consider ﬁrst the special cases with only endowment or investment
risks. This clariﬁes the diﬀerent role played by these two shocks.
144.1 Endowment shocks only
Consider ﬁrst the case in which z is not stochastic, that is, z = ¯ z and the
only source of idiosyncratic uncertainty is the endowment w. Denote by ¯ φ a
suﬃciently high value of the enforcement parameter so that the enforcement
constraint (4) is not binding. When shocks are iid, this is obtained by setting
¯ φ = 1. With persistent shocks, however, ¯ φ must be strictly greater than 1. To
show the importance of ﬁnancial deepness, we compare the limiting cases of
complete markets (φ = ¯ φ) and non-state-contingent assets only (φ = 0). First
we look at the autarky regime and then the regime with ﬁnancial integration.
When φ = ¯ φ, constraint (4) is not binding by deﬁnition. Therefore, the
ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to k and b(w0) are:
U
0(c) = β(1 + rt)U
0(c(w




0(c) = βRt(k, ¯ z)EU
0(c(w
0)) + Rt(k, ¯ z)Eλ(w
0) (8)
where λ(w0) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the limited liability
constraint (5) and Rt(k, ¯ z) = (Pt+1+ν¯ zkν−1)/Pt is the gross marginal return
from the productive asset. Notice that Rt(k, ¯ z) is strictly decreasing in k.
The ﬁrst condition holds for any realization of w0, which implies that next
period consumption, c(w0), must be the same for all w0 (full insurance).5
The second condition, together with the ﬁrst, implies Rt(k, ¯ z) = 1 + rt,
that is, the marginal return from the productive asset is equal to the interest
rate. Because Rt(k, ¯ z) is strictly decreasing in k, this implies that all agents
choose the same input of the productive asset, that is, k = 1. Given that
the supply of the productive asset is ﬁxed, total output is also ﬁxed. The
following lemma establishes that the equilibrium must satisfy β(1 + rt) = 1.
Lemma 1 Consider the autarky regime and assume φ = ¯ φ. Then the inter-
est rate and the price of the asset are constant and equal to r = 1/β −1 and
P = ν¯ z/r.
Proof 1 If β(1 + rt) = 1 is not satisﬁed, condition (7) implies that the
consumption growth of all agents will be either positive or negative. This
cannot be an equilibrium because aggregate output is constant. Therefore, rt =
5This is obvious when the limited liability constraint is not binding so that λ(w0) = 0.
It can be shown that this also holds when λ(w0) > 0.
151/β − 1. Using the fact that all agents use the same units of the productive
asset, k = 1, conditions (7) and (8) imply (Pt+1 +ν¯ z)/Pt = 1+rt. The only
stationary solution for this diﬀerence equation is Pt = Pt+1 = ν¯ z/rt. Q.E.D.
This establishes that with φ = ¯ φ we are in an economy with complete
markets. Let’s look now at the other limiting case in which φ = 0. The
enforceability constraint (4) imposes that b(w1) = ... = b(wN) = b, that is,
claims cannot be state-contingent. The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
U
0(c) = β(1 + rt)EU
0(c(w
0)) + (1 + rt)Eλ(w
0) (9)
U
0(c) = βR(k, ¯ z)EU
0(c(w
0)) + R(k, ¯ z)Eλ(w
0) (10)
In this case we have again that Rt(k, ¯ z) = 1 + rt and the input of the
productive asset is the same for all agents. Individual consumption, how-
ever, is not constant but depends on the realization of the endowment. This
is a standard Bewley (1986) economy with uninsurable endowment risks.
Because all agents use the same input of the productive asset, which is in
limited supply, they get the same investment income. As it is known from the
savings literature (see Huggett (1993), Ayagari (1994) and Carroll (1997)),
the uninsurability of the idiosyncratic risk generates precautionary savings
and in the steady state β(1 + rt) < 1.
Lemma 2 Consider the autarky regime and assume φ = 0. Then the interest
rate satisﬁes rt < 1/β − 1 and the steady state price is P = ν¯ z/r.
Proof 2 Suppose that β(1 + rt) ≥ 1. Because U0(.) is convex, condition (7)
implies that, for all agents, the expected next period consumption is bigger
than current consumption. Therefore, next period aggregate consumption will
also be greater than today consumption. This cannot be an equilibrium be-
cause aggregate income is constant. Therefore, rt < 1/β − 1. Using the fact
that all agents employ the same productive asset, k = 1, conditions (7) and
(8) imply (Pt+1 + ν¯ z)/Pt = 1 + rt. In the steady state the price and the
interest rate are constant. Therefore, P = ν¯ z/r. Q.E.D.
Lemmas 1 and 2 establish that in autarky the economy with lower ﬁnan-
cial deepness (φ = 0) has a lower interest rate and, at least in the steady
16state, a higher price for the asset. Let’s consider now the regime with capital
mobility between two countries with diﬀerent ﬁnancial deepness. Suppose
that country 1 has φ1 = ¯ φ and country 2 has φ2 = 0. The following proposi-
tion characterizes the steady state equilibrium with capital mobility.
Proposition 1 Suppose that φ1 = ¯ φ and φ2 = 0. In the equilibrium with
ﬁnancial integration, rt < 1/β − 1 and country 1 accumulates a negative net
foreign asset position but holds a zero net position in the productive asset.
Proof 1 Appendix B.
The case with φ1 = ¯ φ and φ2 = 0 allowed us to establish analytical re-
sults. From these results we can infer the properties of the equilibrium for
intermediate values of φ. In general, lower values of φ increase precautionary
savings and reduce the equilibrium interest rate. Figure 6 shows the equilib-
rium of the model under autarky and under ﬁnancial integration. The ﬁgure
plots the aggregate demand for assets (i.e. savings) in each country as an
increasing, concave function of r.6 Country 1 has deeper ﬁnancial markets
(φ1 > φ2), and hence lower asset demand for each interest rate. Because the
supply of the productive asset is ﬁxed, aggregate net savings (in terms of the
productive asset) must be zero under autarky in each country. This requires
a higher autarky interest rate in country 1 (r1 > r2).
When the countries become ﬁnancially integrated, the prices of the pro-
ductive asset and the interest rates are equalized. Compared to autarky, the
interest rate and the demand for assets (in units of K) fall in country 1 and
rise in country 2, and hence the country with deeper ﬁnancial markets ends
up with a negative foreign asset position.
A similar result is obtained by Willen (2004) in a two-period endowment
economy with incomplete asset markets and trade, but without investment
shocks. However, as stated in Proposition 1, endowment shocks alone cannot
generate diﬀerences in portfolio composition between ﬁnancial and produc-
tive assets. As we will see in the next section, it is the presence of investment
shocks that generates diﬀerences in portfolio composition.
6The asset demand curves in Figure 6 correspond to the well-known average asset de-
mand curve from the closed-economy heterogenous agents literature (e.g. Aiyagari (1994)).
Average asset demand diverges to inﬁnity as the interest rate approaches the rate of time
preference from below, because agents need an inﬁninte amount of precautionary savings


















Figure 6: Steady state equilibria with heterogeneous ﬁnancial conditions.
To summarize, the analysis of this section shows that the economy with
only endowment shocks can generate nonzero foreign asset positions but can-
not account for diﬀerences in the composition of foreign portfolios. For this
we need investment shocks.
4.2 Investment shocks only
We now consider the case in which the productivity z is stochastic while the
endowment is constant, that is, w = ¯ w. The assumption that investment
income is stochastic allows us to distinguish debt instruments from risky
investments such as FDI. Also in this case it will be convenient to compare
the limiting cases of φ = ¯ φ and φ = 0, starting with autarky.
When φ = ¯ φ, the ﬁrst order conditions are:
U
0(c) = β(1 + rt)U
0(c(z










The ﬁrst condition holds for any realization of z0. Therefore, the next
period consumption, c(z0), must be the same for all realizations of z0 (full
insurance). Because next period consumption is not stochastic, conditions
(11) and (12) imply that ERt(k,z0) = 1+rt. Therefore, there is no marginal
premium for investing in the productive asset and k is the same for all agents.
Thus, Lemma 1 also applies here and the only equilibrium is characterized
18by β(1+rt) = 1. Intuitively, because agents can insure perfectly against the
idiosyncratic risk, there are no precautionary savings and in equilibrium the
interest rate must be equal to the intertemporal discount rate.
Let’s look now at the case with φ = 0. The incentive-compatibility con-
straint (4) imposes that b(z1) = ... = b(zN) = b, that is, claims cannot be
state contingent. The ﬁrst order conditions are:
U
0(c) = β(1 + rt)EU
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Lemma 2 also applies here, that is, the equilibrium interest rate is smaller
than the intertemporal discount rate when φ = 0. This can be proved by
following the same steps of the proof of Lemma 2. The main diﬀerence
with the case of endowment shocks is that now there is a premium over the
interest rate for the expected marginal return from the risky asset. To see
this, consider the case in which the borrowing limit is not binding. Then













Because U0(c(z0)) is in general negatively correlated with Rt(k,z0), the
last term on the right-hand-side is negative. Therefore, ERt(k,z0) > 1 + rt,
that is, there is a marginal premium for investing in the risky asset.
Now suppose that the two countries become ﬁnancially integrated. The
ﬁrst country has φ1 = ¯ φ and the second φ2 = 0. The following proposition
characterizes the new steady state equilibrium with capital mobility.
Proposition 2 Suppose that φ1 = ¯ φ and φ2 = 0. In the steady state with
ﬁnancial integration, r < 1/β−1. Country 1 has a negative net foreign asset
position but a positive position in the productive asset. The average return
of country 1’s foreign assets is larger than the cost of its liabilities.
Proof 2 Appendix B.
The proposition shows that, with investment shocks, countries with deeper
ﬁnancial markets invest in foreign (high return) assets and ﬁnance the invest-
ment with foreign debt. In the particular case in which the most developed
19country has φ1 = ¯ φ, this country ends up with a negative net foreign asset
position. The negativity of the net position, however, cannot be generalized
to any values of φ. Intuitively, if country 1 has a greater ability to insure
than country 2 but the insurance is not perfect, then it will continue to buy
some of the foreign risky asset. By purchasing more of the risky asset, how-
ever, agents take more risk. This in turn may generate enough precautionary
savings up to the point in which the foreign borrowing of country 1 becomes
smaller than the value of the risky assets held abroad. Still, the foreign
position in productive assets is always positive, so this is a general result.7
Another important point is that, if country 1 cannot insure perfectly
against the investment risk, there will be a marginal risk premium also for
country 1. This further increases country 1’s return from the foreign invest-
ment relative to the cost of its foreign liabilities.
4.3 Both endowment and investment shocks.
With both endowment and investment shocks, the ﬁrst order conditions with
φ = ¯ φ and φ = 0 are also given by (11)-(14). The only diﬀerence is that next
period consumption depends on both shocks, that is, c(s0). Lemmas (1) and
(2) also apply to this case. We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose that φ1 = ¯ φ and φ2 = 0. In the steady state with
capital mobility, r < 1/β − 1. Country 1 has a negative net foreign asset
position but a positive position in the foreign productive asset. The average
return of country 1 foreign ownership is bigger than the cost of its liabilities.
Proof 3 Same as in Proposition 2.
This is a restatement of proposition 2. In the extreme case of φ1 = ¯ φ
and φ2 = 0, the addition of endowment shocks does not change the main
properties of the equilibrium. Some of these properties, however, cannot be
generalized to any value of φ1 < φ2. In particular, while it is always true that
the steady state interest rate is smaller than the intertemporal discount rate
and country 1 always acquires a positive net position in foreign productive
7The concavity of the production function, ν < 1, is crucial here. With a linear
technology, as in Angeletos (2006), the most developed country would own all of the
world’s risky asset. This implies that the less developed country does not face any risk,
and therefore, has no incentive to save.
20assets, its total net foreign asset position is not necessarily negative. This
depends on the relative importance of the two shocks: as long as the endow-
ment shock is suﬃciently large, compared to the investment shock, country
1 holds a negative net foreign asset position.
5 Quantitative analysis
In this section we parameterize the model and show its quantitative proper-
ties. The analysis is limited to two countries: the ﬁrst is representative of
the United States while the second aggregates all other countries.
5.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model to match the U.S. share of world GDP, which is about
30 percent. The model can be calibrated to reﬂect this fact in two ways: by
ﬁxing the population size and supply of the productive asset in country 1 to
30 percent of the worldwide quantities, or by setting the average endowment
and productivity of country 1 to 30 percent of the worldwide values. These
two approaches lead to the same results, but the ﬁrst approach is easier to
work with because diﬀerences in size matter only for the market-clearing
conditions.8
The stochastic endowment takes two values, that is, w = ¯ w(1±∆w), with
symmetric transition probability matrix. The investment shock also takes
two values, that is, z = ¯ z(1 ± ∆z) but it is assumed to be iid. Interpreting
w as labor income and y as net capital income, we set ¯ w = 0.85 and then we
parameterize the production function so that y = ¯ zkν = 0.15. Because per-
capita assets are k = 1, this requires ¯ z = 0.15. The return to scale parameter
is set to ν = 0.75.
For the calibration of the stochastic component of the endowment we
follow recent estimates of the U.S. earning process and set the persistence
probability to 0.95 and ∆w = 0.6. These values imply an autocorrelation
coeﬃcient of 0.9 and a standard deviation of log-earnings of 0.30. This is in
the ranges of values estimated by Storesletten, Telmer & Yaron (2004). The
8Let µi be the share of country i and deﬁne Bi and Ki as the per-capita ﬁnancial
claims and productive assets owned by agents in country i. The worldwide market clearing
conditions are B1µ1+B2µ2 = 0 and K1µ1+K2µ2 = 1. With productivity diﬀerences the
per-capita aggregates Bi and Ki would be rescaled by the relative productivity.
21variation in the investment shock is set to ∆z = 2.5. With this parameteri-
zation, the return on the productive asset ﬂuctuates between -6% and 15%.
This approximates the observed volatility of ﬁrm-level proﬁts.
Next we choose the parameters of the ﬁnancial structure, φ1 and φ2.
Several indicators, such as those reported in Figure 1, suggest that ﬁnancial
markets are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across countries. However, it is diﬃcult to
derive a direct mapping from these indicators to actual values of φi. Given
these diﬃculties, we take a pragmatic approach. We begin by assigning
φ1 = 0.4 and φ2 = 0 but then we conduct a sensitivity analysis. These
values imply that contingent claims are not feasible in country 2 while they
are partially feasible in country 1. The equilibrium allocation in country 1
is similar to the allocation that would be achieved if contingent claims were
not available but the volatility of the endowment was 40 percent lower. In
this sense we can say that the ﬁnancial structure of country 1 is about 40
percent more advanced than country 2.9
The utility function is CRRA with the coeﬃcient of risk aversion set to
σ = 2.5. The intertemporal discount rate is chosen to obtain a worldwide
wealth-to-income ratio of 3.5 in the steady state with ﬁnancial integration.
This is the approximate value resulting from survey data such as the Survey
of Consumer Finances for the US. The required value of β is 0.915.
5.2 Results
Table 2 reports some key variables in the steady state equilibria before and
after international ﬁnancial integration. Three cases are considered: A) the
baseline model with both shocks, B) endowment shocks only, and C) in-
vestment shocks only. The transition dynamics following capital markets
liberalization are plotted in Figures 7 and 8. For the description of the com-
putational procedure see the appendix.
5.2.1 Case A: Both Shocks
Long Run Properties. The stationary equilibrium with capital mobility
is characterized by country 1 having a positive position in productive assets
9According to the data shown in Figure 1, the diﬀerence between the ﬁnancial index
for the US and the average index for all other advanced economies is about 40 percent.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to start with φ1 = 0.4 and φ2 = 0.
22but a much larger negative position in riskless bonds. The country net po-
sition in bonds is measured as the sum of the claims b of all agents in the
country. As a percent of income, country 1’s debt position is nearly -168
percent and its position in foreign risky assets is 117 percent. As a result,
the net foreign asset position is negative and quite large, at about -50 per-
cent of income. Because of the higher return from the foreign holdings of
risky assets, country 1 receives positive factor payments, equivalent to 0.27
percent of income, despite the negative net foreign asset position. Moreover,
these large changes in asset positions are accompanied by small changes in
asset prices and the risk free interest rates. The interest rate in country
1 falls by just 70 basis points relative to its autarky value. Interestingly,
Warnock and Warnock’s (2006) estimated the eﬀect of foreign purchases on
the yield for 10-year U.S. Treasury bills and showed that foreign purchases
have contributed to a decline of about 50 basis points on average between
1984 and 2005. Thus, the model is consistent with the data in that the large
decline in the U.S. net foreign assets coincided with the globalization of cap-
ital markets, and with a negative but small eﬀect of foreign inﬂows on the
U.S. risk-free interest rate.
Transition after liberalization. Figure 7 plots the dynamics of several
variables. Before ﬁnancial integration, both countries were in the autarky
steady state and the opening of world capital markets is not anticipated. As
can be seen from the ﬁrst panel, the decline in the net foreign asset position
of country 1 is a slow, gradual process. The current account drops to a deﬁcit
of 4 percent of output on impact and remains in deﬁcit for many periods until
it balances in the limit.
The pattern of a large initial deﬁcit followed by gradual recovery is a con-
sequence of the particular exercise we are conducting, where capital markets
are fully integrated overnight. In reality, the process of ﬁnancial integra-
tion has been gradual (see Figure 2). With gradual integration, the current
account dynamics would been more in line with the U.S. data.10
Figure 7 also plots the composition of foreign assets and the current
10In the data, there are also well-known shocks driving U.S. current account deﬁcits, such
as oil price shocks and the collapse of investment rates in Asia after the 1997-98 Sudden
Stops. However, the goal of our analysis is not to track the cyclical pattern of the U.S.
current account, but to explain the secular decline in its net foreign assets since the mid
1980s. Because ﬂows are usually more volatile than stocks, we believe that understanding
the dynamics of net foreign assets is a more fundamental question.
23Table 2: Steady state with and without capital mobility.
Autarky Capital mobility
Country 1 Country 2 Country 1 Country 2
A) Both shocks
Asset price 3.24 3.69 3.54 3.54
Interest rate 3.08% 2.30% 2.56% 2.56%
Return on risky asset 4.57% 3.94% 3.89% 4.28%
Foreign asset position - - -50.31% 21.31%
Foreign bonds - - -167.62% 70.98%
Foreign risky asset - - 117.31% -49.68%
Net exports - - -0.27% 0.11%
Net factor payments - - 0.27% -0.11%
B) Endowment shocks only
Asset price 3.08 3.44 3.33 3.33
Interest rate 3.66% 3.27% 3.38% 3.38%
Return on risky asset 4.87% 4.36% 4.50% 4.50%
Foreign asset position - - -45.85% 19.65%
Foreign bonds - - -45.85% 19.65%
Foreign risky asset - - 0.00% 0.00%
Net exports - - 1.55% -0.66%
Net factor payments - - -1.55% 0.66%
C) Investment shocks only
Asset price 1.23 1.17 1.20 1.20
Interest rate 8.31% 7.02% 7.58% 7.58%
Return on risky asset 12.18% 12.66% 11.54% 12.99%
Foreign asset position - - -17.78% 7.51%
Foreign bonds - - -62.43% 26.36%
Foreign risky asset - - 44.64% -18.85%
Net exports - - -0.42% 0.18%
Net factor payments - - 0.42% -0.18%
Notes: Foreign asset positions, current account, net exports and net factor payments
are in percentage of domestic income (endowment plus domestic dividends).
24Figure 7: Transition dynamics after capital markets liberalization.
25account. Immediately after ﬁnancial integration, country 1 purchases a large
quantity of foreign productive assets ﬁnanced with foreign debt. As the
country’s wealth declines (due to lower savings), the foreign exposure to
the risky investment is partially reduced. Despite the negative foreign asset
position, country 1 receives net factor payments from abroad due to the
higher return on the productive assets. These payments, however, are more
than compensated by negative net exports and thus the country experiences
current account deﬁcits until it reaches the steady state. Notice that the
portfolio adjustment is very drastic. The reallocation of the portfolio across
debt and risky investments would be smoother if there were adjustment costs
and/or the liberalization of capital markets was gradual.
In summary, the results for case A) highlight three important points.
First, the country with deeper ﬁnancial markets takes a positive position
in foreign risky assets. Because this position is more than compensated
by foreign borrowing, the country’s net foreign asset position is negative.
Still, the higher return from the risky assets allows this country to receive
net positive factor payments from abroad. Second, the magnitude of the
total net foreign liabilities can be large, about half the value of domestic
production. Third, the formation of the external imbalances is a gradual
process that takes a long period of time: only 2/3 of the long-run net foreign
asset position is accumulated in the ﬁrst 15 years.
5.2.2 Cases B and C: One shock only
Long Run Properties. Endowment shocks alone can produce a large neg-
ative foreign asset position (of roughly -46 percent of output). However, they
cannot explain the observed shift in the composition of the portfolios of for-
eign assets. By contrast, the setup with only investment shocks does produce
a portfolio with a substantial increase in debt and a positive position in for-
eign risky assets. However, the total net foreign asset position at steady state
(-18 percent of output) is small compared to what we see in U.S. data.
Transition after liberalization. Figure 8 plots the transition dynamics
in country 1 following ﬁnancial integration in cases A), B), and C). As can
be seen, the dynamics with only one shock are qualitatively similar to those
with both shocks. They only diﬀer in magnitude.
In summary, as anticipated in Section 4, the economy with only endow-
ment shocks generates large net foreign asset positions but cannot capture
26Figure 8: Transition dynamics in country 1 for diﬀerent type of risks.
the fact that a share of US foreign holdings are in high-return assets in the
form of portfolio equity and FDI. On the other hand, the economy with
only investment shocks accounts for the US foreign ownership of high-return
assets but it generates a small net foreign asset position.11 By combining
endowment and investment shocks, we can capture both features of the US
11For some parameterizations, country 1 may accumulate positive asset positions. This
seems to contradict Proposition 2. This proposition, however, applies only to the case with
φ1 = ¯ φ. As remarked in Section 4.2, the country with better ﬁnancial markets invests more
in the risky asset. By doing so, it also takes more risk which increases the incentive to save.
As a result, the country may end up accumulating a positive net foreign asset position.
27international asset position: large net foreign liabilities and a portfolio com-
position tilted toward high-return assets.
5.3 Welfare consequences of ﬁnancial integration
We examine next the normative implications of the model. We are interested
in answering two questions: Is international ﬁnancial integration welfare en-
hancing for the participating countries?, and how are the welfare eﬀects dis-
tributed amongst the population of each country?
Figure 9 plots the welfare consequences of ﬁnancial integration in coun-
tries 1 and 2 as a function of net worth, a, and for diﬀerent realizations of
the endowment.12 We show the results for the same three cases reported
in Table 2: the model with endowment and investment shocks, endowment
shocks alone and investment shocks alone. The welfare eﬀects are computed
as the percentage increase in consumption in the autarky steady state that
makes agents indiﬀerent between remaining in autarky and shifting to the
regime with ﬁnancial integration.
All three charts show that agents with lower initial wealth gain in country
1 and lose in country 2. This is a consequence of the changes in interest rates
after ﬁnancial integration. The interest rate falls in country 1, and this is
beneﬁcial for poorer agents because they are net borrowers and harmful for
wealthy agents because they are net lenders. The opposite is true in country
2 where the interest rate increases after ﬁnancial integration.
The aggregate welfare eﬀects are computed using an equally weighted wel-
fare function. Because all agents are weighted equally, the aggregate welfare
eﬀects depend on the initial distribution over net worth and endowments.
The equally-weighted welfare eﬀects are reported in Table 3. Because most
of the agents are concentrated on the left-hand side of the distribution, the
aggregate welfare eﬀects are dominated by the eﬀects on poorer agents. As a
result, country 1 gains on average while country 2 is worse oﬀ independently
of the types of shocks aﬀecting the economy. For the economy with both
shocks, country 1’s welfare increases by 2.7 percent of consumption while
country 2 experiences a welfare loss of 1.0 percent.
The fact that country 1 gains and country 2 loses on average can be
explained as follows. Without ﬁnancial integration, aggregate savings must
be zero because our model is essentially a Lucas-tree economy without capital
12The current realization of the endowment is a state variable because endowment shocks
are persistent. Investment shocks, instead, can be ignored because z is iid.
28Figure 9: Welfare eﬀects of ﬁnancial integration.
accumulation. The interest rate will adjust so that this holds at equilibrium.
With ﬁnancial integration, however, each country can access the global asset
markets. In particular, country 2 can access higher returns by lending to
country 1. The higher return induces country 2’ agents to save more. But
each individual agent does not internalize that, by saving more, the initial
interest rate received from country 1 is going to fall. This will move the
‘terms of trade’ in favor of country 1 as this country can now borrow at a
cheaper price (lower interest rate).13
It is important to emphasize that in this model ﬁnancial integration has
only a secondary eﬀect on eﬃciency. Although country 2 can beneﬁt from
13This can be easily seen in a simple example that can be solved analytically. Suppose
that there are only two periods and agents in both countries receive the same sequence
of non-stochastic endowments. Diﬀerential incentives to save are generated by assuming
that in each country there is a diﬀerent saving subsidy, γi. This subsidy generates similar
eﬀects on savings as income uncertainty. Further assume that γ2 > γ1 ≥ 1. It can then
be shown that ﬁnancial liberalization generates welfare gains for country 1 and losses for
country 2.
29Table 3: Equally weighted welfare gains (percent of consumption).
Country 1 Country 2
Economy with both risks 2.71 -1.00
Economy with endowment risks 2.86 -1.33
Economy with investment risks 0.47 -0.18
disinvesting in the risky asset, and therefore, from the lower risk, this is
more than compensated by the lower investment income. Thus, if one coun-
try gains, the other must lose. It should be noticed, however, that we are
abstracting from possible dynamic gains that may arise with capital markets
integration such as those associated with technological adoption, risk-sharing,
capital accumulation, and eﬃcient re-allocation of factors of production. In
addition, capital markets integration may contribute to deepen ﬁnancial mar-
kets in countries where they are less developed. The eﬀects reported above
were derived keeping constant the ﬁnancial structure before and after liber-
alization. For these reasons, the results of our welfare analysis should not be
taken as suggesting that ﬁnancial globalization is detrimental for countries
with less developed ﬁnancial markets. Still, the results do suggest that, in
order to argue that ﬁnancial globalization is welfare improving for all partic-
ipating countries, one has to show that the dynamic gains not captured in
our analysis are large.
5.4 Sensitivity analysis: changes in ﬁnancial deepness
Table 4 reports steady state values for diﬀerent parameterizations of φ1 and
φ2. In the top section of the table we reduce φ1 from 0.4 to 0.2, keeping φ2 at
the original value of zero (i.e. we narrow the gap between φ1 and φ2 to 0.2).
In the second panel we increase φ1 to 0.8 with φ2 still at zero (i.e. the gap
between φ1 and φ2 widens to 0.8). In the third panel we study what happens
if ﬁnancial integration implies an increase in φ2 from 0 to 0.2.
The impact of these changes on the equilibrium outcomes is as expected.
More (less) heterogeneity in ﬁnancial deepness leads to larger (smaller) global
imbalances. In particular, the country with more advanced ﬁnancial markets
accumulates larger (smaller) positions in the productive asset and borrows
more (less) from abroad. The welfare eﬀects also become bigger (smaller).
30Table 4: Steady state with and without capital mobility. Sensitivity analysis.
Autarky Capital mobility
Country 1 Country 2 Country 1 Country 2
A) φ1 = 0.2, φ2 = 0.0
Asset price 3.46 3.69 3.62 3.62
Interest rate 2.68% 2.30% 2.42% 2.42%
Return on risky asset 4.25% 3.94% 3.90% 4.10%
Foreign asset position - - -22.74% 9.68%
Foreign bonds - - -81.89% 34.86%
Foreign risky asset - - 59.16% -25.18%
Welfare gains - - 1.23% -0.48%
B) φ1 = 0.8, φ2 = 0.0
Asset price 2.81 3.69 3.37 3.37
Interest rate 3.92% 2.30% 2.88% 2.88%
Return on risky asset 5.33% 3.94% 3.95% 4.69%
Foreign asset position - - -121.54% 51.13%
Foreign bonds - - -330.47% 139.03%
Foreign risky asset - - 208.94% -87.90%
Welfare gains - - 6.72% -2.09%
A) φ1 = 0.4, φ2 = 0.2
Asset price 3.24 3.46 3.39 3.39
Interest rate 3.08% 2.68% 2.81% 2.81%
Return on risky asset 4.57% 4.25% 4.22% 4.41%
Foreign asset position - - -26.84% 11.43%
Foreign bonds - - -78.03% 33.24%
Foreign risky asset - - 51.19% -21.80%
Welfare gains - - 1.34% -0.53%
Notes: Foreign asset positions, current account, net exports and net factor payments
are in percentage of domestic income (endowment plus domestic dividends).
31Still, even in the case with φ1 = 0.2 and φ2 = 0, ﬁnancial integration results in
sizable global imbalances, with country 1 holding a net foreign asset position
of -23 percent of GDP, a debt position of -82 percent, and a position in foreign
risky assets of 60 percent. The welfare gain for country 1 remains large at 1.23
percent of consumption. Note that introducing diﬀerences in the variance of
income ﬂuctuations across countries would have analogous eﬀects. Countries
with more volatile income proﬁles will look similar to countries with lower
values of φ (i.e., they would be countries with stronger precautionary needs).
The results reported at the bottom of Table 4, where φ1 = 0.4 and φ2 =
0.2, are similar to those reported in the top section of the Table (which
assumes φ1 = 0.2 and φ2 = 0). This shows that diﬀerences in the values of φ
are more important than the absolute values. Hence, as long as one country,
or group of countries, are more ﬁnancially developed than the rest, the model
predicts that ﬁnancial globalization produces a large decline in net foreign
assets for the most ﬁnancially developed area and a welfare loss for the less
ﬁnancially developed area.
The case with φ1 = 0.4 and φ2 = 0.2 can be interpreted as capturing
the situation in which ﬁnancial integration facilitates ﬁnancial development
in country 2. The idea is that country 2 starts with φ2 = 0 but, after
liberalization, the enforcement parameter increases to φ2 = 0.2. We can see
that the consequences of liberalization are smaller but still signiﬁcant.
6 Global imbalances with capital accumulation
The model studied so far abstracts from the aggregate accumulation of capi-
tal. The goal of this section is to extend the model to allow for the endogenous
supply of productive assets (i.e. the capital stock).
We make the following changes. First, we assume that production requires
both capital and labor. Without the input of labor, the cross-country location




t )ν, where kt is the input of capital and lt is the eﬃciency units
of labor. Both capital and labor are chosen one period in advance, and
therefore, before observing the shock. Capital depreciates at rate δ. Because
capital is reproducible, its price is Pt = 1.
14New capital could be allocated at home or abroad. Without the labor input, the
return from the investment is independent of the international location. By having labor
as a complementary input of production, the returns from investments depend on wages.
This guarantees that the aggregate cross-country location of capital will be determined.
32The second change is that the previous endowment shocks are now in-
terpreted as shocks to the eﬃciency units of labor. The price of labor—the
wage rate—will be determined in equilibrium to clear the labor market.
Denote the eﬃciency units of labor and the wage rate by εt and wi
t respec-
tively. The idiosyncratic shocks are st = (εt,zt) with conditional probability
distribution g(st,st+1). The agent’s problem is:
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Given the sequence of wages and interest rates, the problem solved by
each individual agent is similar to the problem solved in the previous setup.
The only diﬀerence is that now there is also a choice for the input of labor.
However, because the optimal capital-labor ratio only depends on the wage
and the interest rate, the individual problem is analogous to (6).
The deﬁnition of equilibria provided in Section 3.1 requires only two minor
changes: instead of the price for the productive asset we now have the price
for labor (the wage rate) and the market-clearing condition for the productive
asset is replaced with the market-clearing condition in the labor market.
6.1 Quantitative results
The parametrization of the model uses, when possible, the same parameters
used in the previous model. The risk aversion is σ = 2.5 and the eﬃciency
units of labor follow the same stochastic process as the previous endowment.
In the production function we set ν = 0.75 so that at the individual level
production has the same returns to scale as in the previous model. Then
we choose θ to have an average capital income share of 0.36. The variability
in the investment shock, ∆z, is set to 0.5. This leads to similar volatility
33of capital returns as in the previous model. The targeted wealth-to-income
ratio can now be achieved by choosing either β or δ (in the previous model
there was no depreciation). We proceed by ﬁxing β to 0.94 and then we
choose δ so that the wealth-to-income ratio in the economy with mobility is
3.5. This requires δ = 0.024.
Table 5 compares stationary equilibria before and after ﬁnancial integra-
tion for the three cases examined in Table 2. Qualitatively, the properties of
the model are similar with and without endogenous accumulation of capital.
Because the capital-labor ratio is the same in the two countries, country 1
owns part of the capital located in country 2. At the same time, country
1 borrows heavily from country 2 and the net foreign asset position is neg-
ative. Although not reported, country 1 receives positive factor payments
from abroad because of the much higher return from risky capital.
Quantitatively, the economy with both investment and earning shocks
generates a negative net foreign asset position in country 1 that is nearly
twice as large as the one obtained with the previous model without capital
accumulation. The positions in bonds and risky capital are both smaller with
capital accumulation than without (-130 instead of -168 percent for debt and
33 instead of 117 percent for risky capital), but since the diﬀerence is larger,
the net foreign asset position falls more. The welfare consequences are still
sizable: the welfare gain for country 1 measures 2.1 percent and the loss for
country 2 is almost 0.6 percent. Notice that, with capital accumulation, lib-
eralization does not generate capital gains or losses as in the previous model.
This also contributes in diﬀerentiating the welfare consequences between the
two models. Finally, the combination of the two shocks is still crucial for
reproducing the fact that the large negative foreign asset position of country
1 features a portfolio composed of a large debt position and a positive po-
sition in foreign risky capital. In short, our main ﬁndings are robust to the
introduction of capital accumulation.
We do not report the transition dynamics because they are similar to
those for the economy without capital accumulation. The only important
diﬀerence is that in the ﬁrst period after ﬁnancial integration, there is a large
reallocation of capital from country 2 to country 1. This is because the stock
of capital of country 1 in the autarky equilibrium is smaller than in country
2. Because factor prices are equalized immediately, so does capital. The
reallocation of capital in the ﬁrst period implies a trade deﬁcit and a jump
in net foreign liabilities for country 1 above 20 percent of GDP. Of course,
changing the cross-country location of installed capital may be costly. So it
34Table 5: Steady state with endogenous accumulation of capital.
Autarky Capital mobility
Country 1 Country 2 Country 1 Country 2
A) Both shocks
Wage 0.702 0.693 0.697 0.697
Interest rate 1.56% 0.55% 0.83% 0.83%
Return on risky capital 11.63% 9.19% 9.24% 10.19%
Foreign asset position - - -97.10% 40.33%
Foreign bonds - - -129.76% 53.90%
Foreign risky capital - - 32.66% -13.57%
Welfare gains - - 2.07% -0.58%
B) Endowment shocks only
Wage 0.704 0.710 0.708 0.708
Interest rate 2.68% 2.32% 2.43% 2.43%
Return on risky capital 14.23% 13.06% 13.40% 13.40%
Foreign asset position - - -33.75% 14.46%
Foreign bonds - - -33.75% 14.46%
Foreign risky capital - - 0.00% 0.00%
Welfare gains - - 0.41% -0.17%
C) Investment shocks only
Wage 0.657 0.643 0.649 0.649
Interest rate 4.77% 3.07% 3.60% 3.60%
Return on risky capital 22.59% 19.12% 19.13% 20.79%
Foreign asset position - - -81.92% 34.06%
Foreign bonds - - -98.41% 40.91%
Foreign risky capital - - 16.48% -6.85%
Welfare gains - - 1.14% -0.28%
Notes: Foreign asset positions, current account, net exports and net factor payments
are in percentage of domestic income (endowment plus domestic dividends).
35would make sense to assume the presence of adjustment costs. This would
make the transition to the steady state equilibrium smoother.
7 Conclusion
This paper shows that international ﬁnancial integration can lead to large
and persistent global imbalances when countries diﬀer in the degree of do-
mestic ﬁnancial development. Financial integration induces countries with
deeper ﬁnancial markets to reduce savings and accumulate a large stock of
net foreign liabilities in a long and gradual process. Financial heterogeneity
also aﬀects the composition of the portfolio of net foreign assets. Coun-
tries with deeper ﬁnancial markets borrow heavily from abroad and invest in
high-return foreign risky assets. As a result, they may receive positive factor
payments even if the net foreign asset position is negative. These patterns are
consistent with the features of the U.S. external imbalances observed since
the beginning of the 1980s. Moreover, we can explain these facts solely as the
outcome of ﬁnancial integration in a world with heterogeneity in domestic
ﬁnancial markets, even if the income process of all countries is the same, the
agents’ preferences are identical, and the structure of domestic asset markets
remains unchanged.
Our explanation of large and persistent global imbalances implies that
these imbalances are consistent with intertemporal solvency conditions, so
our analysis predicts that the large negative net foreign asset position of the
U.S. is fully ‘sustainable’ and does not lead to a worldwide ﬁnancial crisis.
Yet, we also ﬁnd that ﬁnancial integration could be undesirable for countries
with poorly developed ﬁnancial systems. We estimated nontrivial welfare
costs for these countries, and the costs are larger for their poorer residents.
However, if ﬁnancial globalization promotes ﬁnancial development and al-
lows for other beneﬁts we abstracted from (e.g., technological diﬀusion, risk
sharing, resource allocation), then the integration of world capital markets
can still be beneﬁcial for all participating countries.
36A Appendix: Set of feasible contingent claims
Suppose that agents have the ability to divert part of their income. Diversion
is observable but not veriﬁable in a legal sense. If an agent diverts x, he or
she retains (1 − φ)x while the remaining part, φx, is lost. We allow φ to be
greater than 1. This can be interpreted as a ﬁne or additional punishment.
A similar assumption is made in Castro, Clementi & MacDonald (2004) but
in an environment with information asymmetry.
Contracts are signed with ﬁnancial intermediaries in a competitive en-
vironment. Financial contracts are not exclusive, meaning that agents can
always switch to another intermediary from one period to the other. The set
of state-contingent claims that an intermediary is willing to oﬀer must be
incentive-compatible.
Let Vt(s,a) be the value function for an agent with current realization of
endowment and investment shocks s, and current net worth a. The net worth
is before consumption. After choosing the contingent claims b(sj), the next
period value is Vt(sj,a(sj)), where a(sj) = wj +zjkν +kPt+1 +b(sj). In case
of diversion, the agent would claim that the realizations of the endowment
and productivity were the lowest levels s1 and divert the diﬀerence wj−w1+
(zj − z1)kν. In this process the agent retains (1 − φ)[wj − w1 + (zj − z1)kν]
and receives b(s1). Therefore, the net worth after diversion is:
w1 + z1k
ν + (1 − φ) · [wj − w1 + (zj − z1)k
ν] + kPt+1 + b(s1) =
a(s1) + (1 − φ) · [wj − w1 + (zj − z1)k
ν]
and the value of diversion is:
Vt











sj , a(s1) + (1 − φ) · [wj − w1 + (zj − z1)k
ν]

which must hold for all j = 1,..,N.
It is important to emphasize that the ﬁnancial intermediary can tell
whether the agent is diverting but there is no court that can verify this and
force the repayment of the diverted funds. Compared to the standard model
with information asymmetries, this assumption is convenient because it sim-
pliﬁes the contracting problem when shocks are persistent. Also convenient
37is the assumption that ﬁnancial contracts are not exclusive and agents can
switch to other intermediaries without a cost. This further limits the pun-
ishments available to the current intermediary. Also notice that, although
the new level of wealth after diversion is veriﬁable when a new contract is
signed, this does not allow the veriﬁcation of diversion because the addi-
tional resources could derive from lower consumption in previous periods,
which is not observable and veriﬁable. Again, the intermediary knows that
the additional resources come from diversion but it cannot legally prove it.
The last assumption is limited liability for which agents renegotiate neg-








































Using standard arguments for recursive problems, we can prove that there
is a unique solution and the function Vt(s,a) is strictly increasing and con-
cave in a.15 The strict monotonicity of the value function implies that the
incentive-compatibility constraint can be written as:
a(sj) ≥ a(s1) + (1 − φ) ·
h
wj − w1 + (zj − z1)k
ν
i
for all j = 1,..,N. This is the constraint we imposed on the original problem.
We shall remark that we arrived at this simple formulation of the con-
straints because of the particular environment. With the alternative assump-
tion of information asymmetries and persistent shocks, the characterization
15The proof is facilitated by deﬁning the variable x = kν. After making the change of
variables k = x1/ν, it can be easily proved that this is a standard concave problem.
38of the optimal contract becomes more complicated. Because the qualita-
tive properties are similar to the model considered here (see, for example,
Fernandes and Phelan (2000)), we opted for the simpler route.
B Appendix: Analytical proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 In both economies we have that R(k, ¯ z) = 1+rt.
Because with capital mobility there is a single worldwide interest rate, all
agents employ the same input of capital k = 1. Therefore, the net posi-
tion in the productive asset is zero. We want to show now that the interest
rate is smaller than the intertemporal discount rate. Suppose, on the con-
trary, that β(1 + rt) ≥ 1. Under this condition agents in country 1 will have
non-negative consumption growth (see Lemma 1) and agents in country 2
will have positive consumption growth (see Lemma 2). This implies that
worldwide consumption growth is positive which cannot be an equilibrium
because aggregate income is constant. Therefore, the equilibrium must sat-
isfy β(1 + rt) < 1. Under this condition, agents in country 1 will experience
negative consumption growth (see again Lemma 1). Therefore, consumption
in country 1 keeps falling until the limited liability constraint (5) binds for
all agents, that is, the net worth becomes zero. Because country 1 holds the
whole amount of domestic productive asset, the zero net worth implies that
the foreign liabilities are equal to the value of the domestic asset. Therefore,
the net foreign asset position of country 1 is negative. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 Suppose that β(1 + r) ≥ 1. Under this con-
dition agents in country 1 will have non-negative consumption growth and
agents in country 2 will have strictly positive consumption growth (Lemmas
1 and 2 apply also to the case with only investment shocks). This implies
that worldwide consumption growth is positive which cannot be a steady
state equilibrium. Therefore, β(1 + rt) < 1. Under this condition agents in
country 1 will experience negative consumption growth (see again Lemma
1). Therefore, consumption keeps falling until the limited liability constraint
(5) binds for all agents. This implies that the net foreign asset position of
country 1 will be negative.
To show that country 1 has a positive net position in the productive asset,
consider again the ﬁrst order conditions (11)-(14). From these conditions we
have that ERt(k,z0) = 1+r in country 1 and ERt(k,z0) > 1+r in country 2.
39The monotonicity of Rt with respect to k implies that the productive asset
used by agents in country 1 must be greater than the productive asset used
by any agent in country 2. Because the supply is the same, country 1 must
own part of the productive asset of country 2.
What remains to be shown is that for country 1 the average return from
the foreign productive investment is higher than the cost of its foreign liabili-
ties. Even thought the marginal return from the productive asset is equalized
to the interest rate, the concavity of the production function implies that the
average return is higher than the interest rate (liability cost). Q.E.D.
C Appendix: Computational procedure
We show ﬁrst that the economy with contingent claims is equivalent to an
alternative economy where contingent claims are not allowed but agents face a
diﬀerent process for the exogenous shocks. We can then solve this equivalent
economy where the agents’ problem is a standard portfolio choice between
risky and riskless assets. After showing this, we describe the computational
procedures used to solve for the steady state and transitional equilibria of
the equivalent economy.
C.1 Equivalent economy
Let ¯ bt be the expected next period value of contingent claims, that is, ¯ bt =
P
st+1 b(st+1)g(st,st+1). Then a contingent claim can be rewritten as b(st+1) =
¯ bt +x(st+1) where, by deﬁnition,
P
st+1 x(st+1)g(st,st+1) = 0. The variable ¯ bt
can be interpreted as a non-contingent bond and the variable x(st+1) is the
pure insurance component of contingent claims.
The law of motion for the next period assets becomes:
a(st+1) = wt+1 + zt+1k
ν
t + ktPt+1 +¯ bt + x(st+1) (16)
Consider the incentive compatibility constraint. Because agents choose
as much insurance as possible, the incentive-compatibility constraint will be
satisﬁed with equality, that is,
a(sj) = a(s1) + (1 − φ) ·
h




Using the law of motion for a, the constraint can be rewritten as:
x(sj) − x(s1) = −φ ·
h




40which must hold for all j > 1. The variables x(sj) must also satisfy the




Therefore, we have N conditions and N unknowns. We can then solve for
all the N values of x. The solution can be written as:
x(sj) = −φ · Wj(st) − φ · Zj(st) · k
ν
t
where Wj(st) and Zj(st) are exogenous variables deﬁned as








Notice that these variables depend on the current shocks which aﬀect the
probability distribution of next period shocks. We made this explicit by
writing the variables as functions of st.
Deﬁne the following variables:
˜ wj(st) = wj − φ · Wj(st)
˜ zj(st) = zj − φ · Zj(st)
These are transformations of the shocks. Using these new shocks, the law of
motion for next period assets can be written as:
a(sj) = ˜ wj(st) + ˜ zj(st)k
ν
t + ktPt+1 +¯ bt
where now agents no longer choose state contingent assets. Therefore, by
redeﬁning the new shocks ˜ wj(st) and ˜ zj(st), the problem becomes a standard
portfolio choice between a risky asset, kt, and a riskless asset, ¯ bt. Diﬀerences
in ﬁnancial deepness are captured by diﬀerence in the stochastic properties of
the transformed shock. So, for example, if φ = 0, we go back to the original
shock because contingent claims are not feasible. If φ = 1 and shocks are
iid, the transformed shock becomes a constant. We are in the case of full
insurance. Any intermediate values allow only for partial insurance. In the
computation we will solve the portfolio choice of the transformed model.
41C.2 Steady state equilibrium
1. Choose a grid for asset holdings a.
2. Guess the steady state values of the interest rate, r, and the price P.
3. Using the ﬁrst-order conditions, solve for the optimal portfolio choices
at each grid point of a and for each s, by iterating on the policy rules.
The solutions are combined using piece-wise linear functions.
4. Find the steady state distribution of agents using the decision rules and
compute the clearing conditions for the risky and riskless assets.
5. Update the guesses for the interest rate and the price of the productive
asset (step 2) until the market clearing conditions are satisﬁed.
C.3 Transitional equilibrium
1. Solve for the initial and ﬁnal steady states (autarky and mobility).
2. Choose the number of transition periods T. This number should be
suﬃciently large to allow the economy to reach, approximately, the
new steady state in T periods.
3. Guess transition sequences for the interest rates, {rt}T
t=1, and for the
price of the productive asset {Pt}T
t=1.
4. Using the ﬁrst-order conditions, solve for the optimal portfolio choices
backward starting from T. This provides the sequence of optimal de-
cision rules at t = 1,2,..,T.
5. Using the optimal decision rules, ﬁnd the sequence of distributions and
compute the market-clearing conditions at time t = 1,2,..,T.
6. Update the guess for the sequences of the interest rates and the prices
of the productive asset (step 3) until the market-clearing conditions are
satisﬁed at all points in time t = 1,2,..,T.
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